Well, how would you do it? We all know the theories about
intelligence gathering: identify targets clearly, do not be guided by
paranoia, ensure that information is analyzed and contextualized so that
it can be understood properly, and observe constitutional and legal
guidelines, notably in spying on one’s own citizens. It is not, of
course, so easy in practice and certainly not in the wake of surprise
attacks like those of 1941 and 2001, or when working carefully within
legal and political restrictions and conventions that, to put it mildly,
do not appear fit for the purpose, given the enormity of the threat.
In “Code Warriors,” Stephen Budiansky,
who has already written ably on World War II codebreaking, offers an
exciting but also challenging account of the National Security Agency’s
efforts to discover the Soviet Union’s secrets—challenging because he
does not shun the necessary details in explaining code, codebreaking and
how systems in the East and West changed during the years.
In
doing so, he provides an intelligence history of the United States
during the Cold War, one that ranges from U.S. “ferret flights” in the
1950s, often off the Baltic coast of the Soviet Union—designed to
provide information on air defenses—to some of its more serious
failures. These included the Cuban Missile Crisis (the NSA failed to
warn the Kennedy administration about the arrival of Soviet SS-4
missiles); intelligence analysis prior to the surprisingly vast Tet
offensive against South Vietnam in 1968; and the treatment of the Tonkin
Gulf incident in 1964. It was believed that North Vietnam twice
attacked a U.S. ship, and this led Congress to grant the president
enhanced war powers. In fact, bad intelligence made Navy officers think
they were under attack a second time. “NSA’s inexperience in
intelligence analysis and frantic efforts to supply the White House with
information” led to inaccurate conclusions and “guesswork,” Mr.
Budiansky concludes.
Much of the tale is unedifying, with many of the leading figures in
the intelligence community paying more attention to bureaucratic turf
wars than to fighting the Cold War. If the CIA is held up for particular
obloquy, it joins the Army, Navy and Air Force, especially the last
two. There is praise for the NSA but also much criticism: “a system ripe
for intellectual corruption . . . self-justifying assurance . . .
reflexive defensiveness . . . hoarding information . . . vast
multilayered bureaucracy . . . blunders, scandals and bureaucratic
miscalculations.” The NSA is criticized for an extremely cozy
relationship with Nixon’s White House, one driven by its attempt to
promote its standing in the corridors of Washington power. And so on.
Less
emphasis is placed on the NSA’s successes, but they are discussed. The
role of the NSA’s global signals-intelligence network in providing
reassurance about the contrast between bold Soviet threats and more
modest actions is seen as helping limit the danger of nuclear war and
thus allowing the strategy of containment to work. Helped by agents in
place as well as technology, the NSA repeatedly intercepted Soviet
communications, ensuring that, as one NSA director later noted, “in the
mid-1970s, NSA had access to just about everything the Russian
leadership said to themselves and about one another. . . . We knew Brezhnev’s
waist size, his headaches, his wife’s problems, his kids’ problems, his
intentions on the Politburo with regard to positions, his opinion on
American leadership, his attitude on negotiating positions.” The last,
Mr. Budiansky argues, helped Henry Kissinger outmaneuver Soviet negotiations in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Mr.
Budiansky makes no bones about the crimes of communist regimes or,
indeed, about the damage done by American press reports on secret
operations. But he also claims that “the cryptologic struggle that took
place in the shadows behind the shadows was as morally ambiguous as
everything about the Cold War.” In fact, the NSA performed admirably
pursuing confrontation short of conflict and limited war strategies in
the face of the prospect of thermonuclear cataclysm. Much of the
American public was unable to accept the serious dangers posed by
communist expansionism, and the KGB and the Soviet military had far more
influence on Soviet policy-making than the intelligence community did
in the U.S.
The faults noted by Mr. Budiansky existed but,
alongside the bureaucratic rigidity and mistakes he discusses, there was
also a greater willingness to accept internal disagreements than in the
Soviet system. In particular, the Soviets proved better at descriptive
intelligence gathering than at its analytic intelligence counterpart:
They found it difficult to put together the empirical pieces. Although
the individual KGB directorates could perform well, they could not
integrate the information provided by different sources as well as their
American and British counterparts.
Mr. Budiansky notes the
tendency of analysis to buttress a priori assumptions, but this was more
pronounced in the Soviet system, notably in the case of Yuri Andropov,
the KGB head who became Soviet leader from 1982 to 1984. He believed in
the inherent mendacity of Western imperialist leaders and society and
their willingness to wage war against the Soviet Union. This was, for
instance, the reason he misperceived the 1983 NATO military exercise
called Able Archer as a cover for a possible attack.
Particularly
good on the first half of the Cold War, but weaker and far briefer on
the 1970s and, even more, the 1980s, Mr. Budiansky’s engaging study
offers contemporary policy markers much to contemplate. The simultaneous
hostility of both China and Russia today ensures that the strategic
situation is more challenging now than after the successful exploitation
by President Nixon of the Sino-Soviet split. European neutralism and
weakness does not help. In these circumstances, it is urgent to consider
how best to use intelligence operations to defend national interests.
It would of course be helpful if the latter were better understood.
Mr. Black’s books include “The Cold War: A Military History” and “Air Power: A Global History.”